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Abstract
This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments
of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evi-
dence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and
the logic of evidence and truth (LETJ ), designed to deal, respectively, with evi-
dence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4,
it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that
provide decidability are given for both BLE and LETJ . The meanings of the con-
nectives of BLE and LETJ , from the point of view of preservation of evidence,
is explained with the aid of an inferential semantics. A formalization of the no-
tion of evidence for BLE as proposed by M. Fitting is also reviewed here. As
a novel result, the paper shows that LETJ is semantically characterized through
the so-called Fidel structures. Some opportunities for further research are also
discussed.
1 Introduction
Paraconsistency is the study of technical and philosophical aspects of formal systems
in which the presence of a contradiction does not imply triviality, that is, systems
with a non-explosive negation ¬ such that a pair of propositions A and ¬A does not
(always) lead to trivialization. Differently from classical (and intuitionistic) logic,
in paraconsistent logics triviality is not tantamount to contradictoriness. Paraconsis-
tent logics are able to deal with contradictory contexts of reasoning by means of the
rejection of the principle of explosion, according to which anything follows from a
contradiction.
From the philosophical point of view, maybe the most important question in para-
consistency addresses the nature of the contradictions allowed by paraconsistent log-
ics. The answer to this question, of course, would better have some impacts on the
formal systems. There are two basic approaches to this problem. On the one hand, the
dialetheists claim that there are some true contradictions [?, e.g.]]dial.sta. This means
that reality is contradictory in the sense that some pairs of contradictory propositions
are needed in order to correctly describe reality. On the other hand, the epistemic ap-
proach to paraconsistent claims that it is much more plausible to consider that all con-
tradictions that occur in real-life contexts of reasoning are epistemic in the sense that
they are related to and/or originated in thought and language. The latter is the position
endorsed by the authors of this text and has been already presented and defended in
some papers (e.g. [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016b)], [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2015)],
[Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016d)]). Our aim here is to review the central points of the
epistemic approach on paraconsistency, as well as to present some recent develop-
ments.
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The remainder of this text is structured as follows. In the section 2, we start by
explaining the duality between paraconsistent and paracomplete (so also intuitionis-
tic) logics. We will show that the central point is not really a duality between logics,
but rather a duality between principles of inference that may be added to a common
core, obtaining thus paracomplete or paraconsistent logics. Next, in section 3, we
will present the epistemic reading of contradictions in connection with conﬂicting ev-
idence. Evidence is an epistemic notion, weaker than truth, that means ‘reasons for
believing/accepting’ a proposition as true (or false). In sections 4 and 5 we present
two formal systems, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and
truth (LETJ ). BLE is a natural deduction system designed to preserve evidence. It
can be seen that BLE coincides with Nelson’s paraconsistent logic N4; however, the
motivations and interpretations of both systems are different. LETJ is a logic of for-
mal inconsistency and undeterminateness (LFIU) that adds to BLE means to recover
classical logic for formulas that have been established as true (or false). LETJ , thus,
is capable of talking simultaneously about preservation of truth and preservation of
evidence. Section 6 presents complete and correct valuation semantics for BLE and
LETJ . Such semantics, however, are better understood as tools to prove technical re-
sults than semantics in the sense of providing meanings to the formal system. That the
meanings of the expressions in the context of BLE and LETJ are given bay the infer-
ences allowed is the topic of Section 7, where an inferential semantics is proposed for
the logics BLE and LETJ . Although the notion of preservation of evidence is deﬁned
by the logic BLE in a precise way, the notion of evidence presented in section 3 is
only intuitively explained. In section 8 we show the formalization of the notion of
evidence provided by Melvin Fitting using justiﬁcation logics [Fitting(2016)]. Fitting
has shown that BLE has both implicit and explicit evidence interpretations in a strictly
formal sense. In section 9 a semantics of Fidel structures is presented for the logics
BLE and LETJ . In spite of the fact that the algebraizability of LETJ has not been
established yet, an ‘algebraic-relational semantics’ like the one here presented sheds
light upon the algebraic aspects of this logic. Finally, in section 10, we will point
at some possible topics for further inquiry and philosophical research in the ﬁeld of
paraconsistency.1
1Some parts of this text draw on other papers by the authors. Parts of sections 2 and 3 have appeared
in [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016d)]. The formal systems presented in sections 4 and 5, as well as the
valuation semantics of section 6, appear in [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016c)]. Section 7 sums up the ideas
presented in [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016a)].
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2 On the duality between paraconsistency and para-
completeness
At ﬁrst sight, it seems to be an easy conclusion that paraconsistent and intuitionistic
logics are ‘dual’, since excluded middle does not hold in the latter and some contra-
dictions are accepted in the former.2 Indeed, if we take a look at how Newton da Costa
devises C1, the ﬁrst logic of his Cn hierarchy [?, see]p. 499]costa1974, it is not difﬁ-
cult to see that there is a sort of ‘informal duality’ between C1 and intuitionistic logic.
In the former, excluded middle and introduction of double negation hold, although in
the latter non-contradiction and double elimination of negation hold.
However, in our view, this approach to paraconsistency is somewhat misleading.
The central point is not that the logics are dual, nor that excluded middle and non-
contradictions are dual formulas, but rather that the inference rules excluded middle
(PEM) and explosion (EXP) are dual. This is easily seen in the framework of sequent
calculus and multiple-conclusion logic.
Γ) A,⇠A,Δ
PEM
Γ, A,⇠A) Δ
EXP
Indeed, added to the positive fragment of Gentzen’s system LK [Gentzen(1935)], the
axioms above yield classical logic. Notice that although PEM and EXP are axioms of
sequent calculus, they express the fact that, classically,A_⇠A follows from anything,
and anything follows from A ^⇠A. From the point of view of classical logic, the in-
validity of PEM in paracomplete (for instance, intuitionistic) logics and the invalidity
of EXP in paraconsistent logics are like ‘mirror images’ of each other.
Now, to see the duality from the semantical viewpoint, let us take a look at the se-
mantic characterization of classical negation⇠. A negation is classical if the following
conditions hold (for classical _ and ^):
A ^⇠A ✏, (1)
✏ A _⇠A. (2)
According to condition (1), there is no modelM such that A^⇠A holds inM. (2) ex-
presses the fact that for every modelM, A_⇠A holds inM. A paracomplete negation
disobeys (2), and a paraconsistent negation disobeys (1). Intuitionistic negation is an
example of a paracomplete negation. Each one of the conditions above corresponds to
half of the classical semantic clause for negation, respectively:
M(⇠A) = T only ifM(A) = F ; (3)
2Actually, the invalidity of the principle of non-contradiction is not an essential feature of paraconsistent
logics, although the authors of this text share the opinion that both non-contradiction and explosion should
be invalid in any paraconsistent logic. An example of a paraconsistent logic where explosion does not hold
but non-contradiction is a valid formula is the Logic of Paradox [?, see]]priest.lp.
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M(⇠A) = F only ifM(A) = T. (4)
The clause (3) above forbids that both A and ⇠A receive True, and the clause (4)
forbids that both receive False. Given the classical account of logical consequence –
B follows from A iff there is no modelM such that A is true but B is false inM – from
the conditions above it follows that anything is a logical consequence of A ^⇠A and
A _⇠A is a logical consequence of anything.
A counterexample to the principle of explosion is given by a circumstance such
that a pair of propositions A and ¬A hold but a proposition B does not hold (¬ be-
ing a paraconsistent negation). Dually, a paracomplete logic requires a circumstance
such that both A and ¬A do not hold (now ¬ is a paracomplete negation). Notice that
neither a paracomplete nor a paraconsistent negation is a contradictory-forming op-
erator, in the sense that applied to a proposition A they do not produce a proposition
¬A such that A and ¬A cannot receive simultaneously the value F, nor simultane-
ously the value T – i.e. they do not ‘invert’ the semantic value of A. Besides, neither
a paracomplete nor a paraconsistent negation is a ‘truth-functional’ operator because
the semantic value of ¬A is not unequivocally determined by the value ofA: in a para-
consistent logic, ifA receives T, the value of ¬Amay be T or F, and in a paracomplete
logic, if A receives F, ¬A may be T or F. It is important to call attention to the fact
that we talk about the semantic values True and False here as a ‘façon de parler’. From
the epistemic viewpoint proposed here, neither paraconsistent nor paracomplete logics
are talking about truth.
3 Epistemic contradictions
We have seen above the duality between the failure of explosion and excluded middle,
respectively, in paraconsistent and paracomplete logics. An example of an intuitive
motivation for a paracomplete negation is given by intuitionistic logic, where a cir-
cumstance such that there is no constructive proof of A nor of ¬A acts as a counter-
example for excluded middle. Indeed, the usual proof by cases,
A! B,¬A! B ` B,
cannot be performed in intuitionistic logic. But what would be a justiﬁcation for a
paraconsistent, non-explosive negation?
There are two basic answers to this question. The dialetheist claims that there
are true contradictions [Priest and Berto(2013)], what means that contradictions, so
to speak, ‘belong to the essence of reality’. But since it is not the case that every-
thing holds, a paraconsistent logic is needed in order to describe reality correctly. The
other answer, already mentioned here, says that a non-explosive negation should be
understood from the epistemic viewpoint.
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The acceptance ofA and ¬A in some contexts of reasoning does not need to mean,
and actually does not mean, that both are true. There are a number of circumstances in
which we deal with pairs of propositions A and ¬A such that there are good reasons
for accepting and/or believing in both. It does not mean of course that both are true,
nor that we actually believe that both are true, although we still want to draw inferences
in the presence of them. We have already argued elsewhere that a non-dialetheist posi-
tion in paraconsistency ascribes a property weaker than truth to a pair of propositions
A and¬A that ‘hold’ in a given context [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016c)]. We propose
the notion of evidence, understood as ‘reasons for believing/accepting a proposition’,
to play the role of such a property. There may be evidence that A is true even if A
is false, and conﬂicting evidence occurs when there are reasons for accepting A and
reasons for accepting ¬A, both simultaneous and non-conclusive.3
The reading of contradictions as conﬂicting evidence ﬁts well with the practices of
empirical sciences. There are an extensive literature about contradictions in sciences
(e.g. [da Costa and French(2003)], [Nickles(2002)]). The notion of contradictions as
conﬂicting evidence is in line with the view that empirical theories are better seen as
tools to solve problems, rather than descriptions of the world (these two approaches
are discussed by [Nickles(2002)]). Of course, the occurrence of contradictions is a
problem for the descriptive view of theories, since the latter requires that such a repre-
sentation be correct (i.e. true). Once this non-representational view of scientiﬁc work
is accepted, contradictions in the empirical sciences are better viewed as originated in
limitations of our cognitive apparatus, failure of measuring instruments and/or inter-
actions of these instruments with phenomena, stages in the development of scientiﬁc
theories or even simply mistakes, to be corrected.
4 BLE: the Basic Logic of Evidence
In this section, we present a natural deduction system, the Basic Logic of Evidence
(BLE), suited to the reading of contradictions as conﬂicting evidence. BLE ends up
being equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, but has been conceived for a different purpose
(see Section 9.1). The rules of BLE intend to express preservation of evidence in the
following sense: supposing the availability of evidence for the truth (or falsity) of the
premises, we ask whether an inference rule yields a conclusion for which evidence for
its truth (or falsity) is also available. This approach has an analogy to the inference
rules for intuitionistic logic, when the latter is understood epistemically as concerned
with the availability of a constructive proof. Indeed, the basic idea of the Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation is that an inference rule is valid if it transforms
constructive proofs for one or more premises into a constructive proof of the conclu-
3The use we make here of the notion of evidence is close to how evidence in understood in epistemology
– see [Kelly(2014)], [Achinstein(2010)] and also [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016c)].
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sion. Natural deduction systems has been presented by [Gentzen(1935)] as formalisms
capable of expressing ‘natural logical reasoning’. Natural deduction ﬁts our purpose
here because we want to express how people actually, and naturally, draw inferences
when the criterion is preservation of evidence.
Consider that the falsity of A is represented here by ¬A. ‘Evidence that A is
true’ is understood as ‘reasons for accepting/believing in A’, and ‘evidence that A
is false’ means ‘reasons for accepting/believing in ¬A’. BLE is paraconsistent and
paracomplete, neither explosion nor excluded middle hold. This is because there may
be contexts with conﬂicting evidence as well as contexts with no evidence at all. In
the former both A and ¬A hold, in the latter both A and ¬A do not hold.
DEFINITION 1. The basic logic of evidence BLE
Consider the propositional language L1 deﬁned in the usual way over the set of con-
nectives {^,_,!,¬}. S1 is the set of of formulas of L1. Roman capitals stand for
meta-variables for formulas of L1. The following natural deduction rules deﬁne the
logic BLE:
A ^B
A
^E
A ^B
B
A B
A ^B
^I
A
A _B
_I
B
A _B
A _B
[A]....
C
[B]....
C
C
_E
[A]....
B
A! B
! I
A! B A
B
! E
¬A
¬(A ^B)
¬ ^ I
¬B
¬(A ^B)
¬(A ^B)
[¬A]....
C
[¬B]....
C
C
¬ ^ E
¬A ¬B
¬(A _B)
¬ _ I
¬(A _B)
¬A
¬ _ E
¬(A _B)
¬B
A ¬B
¬(A! B)
¬ ! I
¬(A! B)
A
¬ ! E
¬(A! B)
¬B
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A
¬¬A
DN
¬¬A
A
As an example, let us see how the preservation of evidence works w.r.t. the intro-
duction rules for ^, _ and! . If  and 0 are evidence, respectively, for A and B, 
and 0 together constitute evidence for A ^B. Similarly, if  constitutes evidence for
A, then  is also evidence for any disjunction that has A as one disjunct. For ! I ,
when the supposition that there is evidence  for A leads to the conclusion that there
is evidence 0 for B, this is evidence for A! B. The implication, thus, works analo-
gously to both classical and intuitionistic logic. It is not necessary that the contents of
A and B be related.
The rules in which the conclusion is a negation of a conjunction, a disjunction or
an implication cannot be obtained from the rules we already have because introduction
of negation does not hold.4 In order to obtain the negative rules we have to ask what
would be sufﬁcient conditions for having evidence for the falsity of a conclusion. So,
if  is evidence that A is false,  constitutes evidence that A ^ B is false – mutatis
mutandis for B. Thus, we obtain the rule ¬ ^ I . Analogous reasoning for disjunction
and implication gives the respective introduction rules ¬ _ I and ¬ ! I .5
It is well-known that the elimination rules for ^, _ and ! may be obtained
from the introduction rules with the help of the inversion principle, presented by
[Prawitz(1965)] as a reﬁnement of the famous Gentzen’s remarks that the introduc-
tions rules are, so to speak, ‘deﬁnitions’ of the connectives, and the eliminations rules
are ‘consequences’ of these deﬁnitions [Gentzen(1935), p. 80]. Analogous reasoning
works for the ‘negative’ elimination rules, ¬ ! E, ¬ ^ E and ¬ _ E. Suppose an
application of the rule ¬ ! E that concludes A from ¬(A! B). A and ¬B together
are sufﬁcient conditions for obtaining ¬(A ! B). So, a derivation of the latter ‘al-
ready contains’ a derivation of A.6 Notice that the negation rules exhibit a ‘symmetry’
with respect to the corresponding assertion rules for the dual operators.
5 A logic of evidence and truth
The logic BLE can express preservation of evidence. But in some contexts of reason-
ing we deal simultaneously with truth and evidence, that is, with propositions that are
4To see that A ! B,A ! ¬B ` ¬A does not hold, suppose there is conﬂicting evidence for B and
¬B, but there is no evidence for ¬A. So, both A! B and A! ¬B hold, but ¬A does not hold.
5The idea that natural deduction rules for concluding falsities may be obtained in a way similar to the
rules for concluding truths is found e.g. in [López-Escobar(1972)] and also in [Prawitz(1965)]. Instead of
asking about the conditions of assertability, the point is to ask about the conditions of refutability. This
criterion works also for preservation of evidence.
6A more detailed account of the natural deduction rules of BLE is found in
[Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016c)]. Regarding the inversion principle, see [Prawitz(1965), p. 33].
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taken as conclusively established as true (or false), as well as others for which only
non-conclusive evidence is available. Since preservation of truth is the criterion for
a valid inference in classical logic, we get a tool for also dealing with true and false
propositions if we can restore classical logic precisely for those propositions.
The Logics of Formal Inconsistency (from now on LFIs) are a family of paracon-
sistent logics that encompasses a great number of paraconsistent systems developed
within the Brazilian tradition. LFIs are able to express the notion of ‘consistency’ of
propositions inside the object language employing a unary connective: ◦A means that
A is consistent. Like any other paraconsistent logic, the principle of explosion does
not hold in LFIs. But LFIs are so designed that some contradictions, that we call
consistent contradictions, lead to triviality. Intuitively, one can understand the notion
of a ‘consistent contradiction’ as a contradiction involving well-established facts, or
involving propositions that have been conclusively established as true (or false) – no-
tice that the point is precisely to prohibit consistent contradictions. A logic L is an
LFI if the following holds:
For some Γ, A and B: Γ, A,¬A 0 B,
For every Γ, A and B: Γ, ◦A,A,¬A ` B.
LFIs start from the principle that propositions about the world can be divided into two
categories: non-consistent and consistent ones. The latter are subjected to classical
logic, and consequently a theory T that contains a pair of contradictory sentences
A,¬A explodes only if A is taken to be a consistent proposition.7
The motivation of LFIs, restricting some logical property to some propositions,
has been extended. In the Logics of Formal Undeterminedness (from now on LFUs),
a class of paracomplete logics introduced in [Marcos(2005)], excluded middle can be
restricted, and recovered, in a way analogous to LFIs restrict and recover explosion.
Propositions can be divided into determined and non-determined ones, and a theory T
may contain a proposition A such that neither A nor ¬A hold. In an LFU the language
is extended by a new unary connective , where A means that A is (in some sense)
determined. A logic L is an LFU if the following holds:
For some Γ, A and B: Γ, A ` B,Γ,¬A ` B but Γ 0 B,
For every Γ, A and B: if Γ, A ` B and Γ,¬A ` B, then Γ, A ` B.
7The idea of expressing a metalogical notion within the object language is found, e.g. in the Cn hier-
archy introduced by [da Costa(1963)], through the idea of ‘well-behavedness’ of a formula. In da Costa’s
hierarchy, however, this is done employing a deﬁnition: in C1 it is expressed by A◦, an abbreviation of
¬(A ^ ¬A), which makes the ‘well-behavedness’ of A equivalent to saying that A is non-contradictory.
On the other hand, in the LFIs, ◦A is introduced in such a way that allows ◦A and ¬(A ^ ¬A) to be log-
ically independent (non-equivalent). The family of LFIs incorporate a wide class of paraconsistent logics,
as shown in [Carnielli et al.(2007)Carnielli, Coniglio, and Marcos] and [Carnielli and Coniglio(2016)].
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An LFI and an LFU may be combined in an LFIU – a Logic of Formal Inconsis-
tency and Undeterminateness. Explosion and excluded middle may be recovered at
once with respect to a given formula A, and hence the properties of classical negation
with respect to A. Since here we want to recover consistency and determinateness si-
multaneously, we use the symbol ◦ for both notions. The logic of evidence and truth
obtained by extending BLE, is an LFIU.
DEFINITION 2. The logic of evidence and truth LETJ .
Consider the propositional language L2 deﬁned in the usual way over the set of con-
nectives {^,_,!,¬, ◦}. S2 is the set of of formulas of L2. The logic of formal
inconsistency and undeterminedness LETJ is deﬁned by adding to BLE the rules be-
low:
◦A
[A]....
B
[¬A]....
B
B
PEM◦
◦A A ¬A
B
EXP ◦
From ‘outside’ of the system, ◦A means the truth-value of A has been conclusively
established, or that there is conclusive evidence with respect to the truth-value of A.
So, the fact that a proposition A is true is expressed as ◦A ^ A, and the fact that A is
false as ◦A ^ ¬A.
The unary operator, ◦ may be called a classicality operator because when
◦A1, ..., ◦An hold, classical logic is recovered for all formulas that depend only on
A1, ..., An and are formed with!, ^, _ and ¬.8
6 Valuation semantics for BLE and LETJ
The valuation semantics to be presented in this section for BLE and LETJ does not
intend to be a ‘semantics’ in the sense of a non-linguistic device that ‘explains the
meaning’ of the corresponding deductive system – like, for example, the truth-tables
for classical logic and the possible-worlds semantics for alethic modal logic. In the lat-
ter, the semantic clauses ‘make sense’ independently of the deductive system. On the
other hand, the valuation semantics to be presented here is better seen as a mathemat-
ical tool capable of representing the inference rules in such a way that some technical
results may be proved.
Valuation semantics have been proposed for the logics of da Costa’s hi-
erarchy Cn as a “generalization of the common semantics of the clas-
sical propositional calculus” [da Costa and Alves(1977), p. 622]. Later
on, valuation semantics have been proposed also for da Costa’s logic C!
8More details and several technical results that ﬁt the intended intuitive interpretation of BLE and LETJ
in terms of evidence and truth are to be found in [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016c)]).
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[Loparic(1986)], intuitionistic logic [Loparic(2010)] and several Logics of For-
mal Inconsistency (LFIs) ([Carnielli et al.(2007)Carnielli, Coniglio, and Marcos] and
[Carnielli and Coniglio(2016)]). Given a language L, valuations are functions from
the set of formulas of L to {0, 1} in such a way that the semantic clauses are a kind of
representations of the axioms. Roughly speaking, as we will see, assigning 1 and 0 to
a formula A means, respectively, that A holds and A does not hold.
DEFINITION 3. A semivaluation s for BLE is a function from the set S1 of formulas
to {0, 1} such that:
(i) if s(A) = 1 and s(B) = 0, then s(A! B) = 0,
(ii) if s(B) = 1, then s(A! B) = 1,
(iii) s(A ^B) = 1 iff s(A) = 1 and s(B) = 1,
(iv) s(A _B) = 1 iff s(A) = 1 or s(B) = 1,
(v) s(A) = 1 iff s(¬¬A) = 1,
(vi) s(¬(A ^B)) = 1 iff s(¬A) = 1 or s(¬B) = 1,
(vii) s(¬(A _B)) = 1 iff s(¬A) = 1 and s(¬B) = 1,
(viii) s(¬(A! B)) = 1 iff s(A) = 1 and s(¬B) = 1.
DEFINITION 4. A semivaluation s for LETJ is a function from the set S2 of formulas
to {0, 1} that satisﬁes the clauses (i)-(viii) of Deﬁnition 3 plus the following clause:
(ix) if s(◦A) = 1, then (s(A) = 1 if and only if s(¬A) = 0).
DEFINITION 5. A valuation for BLE/LETJ is a semivaluation for which the condition
below holds:
(Val) For all formulas of the form A1 ! (A2 ! ... ! (An ! B)...) with B not of
the form C ! D:
if s(A1 ! (A2 ! ... ! (An ! B)...)) = 0, then there is a semivaluation s0
such that for every i, 1  i  n, s(Ai) = 1 and s(B) = 0.
Logical consequence in BLE and LETJ is deﬁned as usual: Γ ✏ A if and only if for
every valuation v, if v(B) = 1 for all B 2 Γ, then v(A) = 1. The semantics above is
sound and complete, and provides a decision procedure for BLE and LETJ by means
of the quasi-matrices (see [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016c)]). Below, as an example,
we show how the quasi-matrices work.
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EXAMPLE 6. p! (¬p! q) is invalid in BLE.
p 0 1
¬p 0 1 0 1
q 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
¬p! q 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
p! (¬p! q) 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12
In the example 6 above, the semi-valuation s11 turns out to be a valuation that acts as
a counter-example. Notice that BLE and LETJ are not compositional, in the sense that
the semantic value of a complex formula is not always functionally determined by the
semantic values of its component parts.
EXAMPLE 7. ◦p! (p _ ¬p) is valid in LETJ .
p 0 1
¬p 0 1 0 1
◦p 0 0 1 0 1 0
p _ ¬p 0 1 1 1 1 1
◦p! (p _ ¬p) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
In the example 7 above, the semi-valuation s1 is not a valuation, since the clause Val
of Deﬁnition 5 is not satisﬁed. BLE, being coincident with Nelson’s logic N4, is an
extension of positive intuitionistic logic (PIL). Indeed, clauses (i)-(iv) of deﬁnition 3
plus clause (Val) of deﬁnition 5 give a valuation semantics for PIL.9
7 Inferential semantics for BLE and LETJ
According to the standard view, syntax is concerned with the formal properties of lin-
guistic expressions without regard to their meanings. Syntax, thus, includes formulas,
axioms, rules of inference and proofs – in sum: manipulation of symbols according
to certain rules. The word ‘semantics’ in the broad sense has to do with the meanings
of the linguistic expressions, and such meanings are given by how the expressions
are ‘related to reality’. However, when a semantics is given to a deductive system, it
is not always the case that the respective semantic values ‘explain the meanings’ of
the corresponding expressions. Especially in the case of non-classical logics, it is not
uncommon that the semantics, although a useful tool for providing counter-examples,
9A more detailed presentation of valuation semantics for BLE and LETJ may be found in
[Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016c)] and [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016a)].
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decision methods and other relevant results, actually does not give any explanation
of the meanings of the expressions, let alone the deductive system as a whole. An
example of this situation is precisely the valuation semantics presented above for BLE
and LETJ . However, the semantics of a deductive system, in the broad sense of an
explanation of meaning, may be provided by the syntax, that is, by how the system is
used to make inferences.
The proof-theoretic – or inferential – semantics is an approach to meaning orig-
inated in the natural deduction for intuitionistic logic.10 Differently from the truth-
conditional theory of meaning, inferential semantics provides meanings to the con-
nectives of intuitionistic logic without the need of a semantics in the standard sense,
i.e. the attribution of semantic values to formulas. The meanings are given by the de-
ductive system itself, or more precisely, by the inference rules, that in this case do not
express preservation of (a transcendent notion of) truth, but rather preservation of the
availability of a constructive proof. The ‘link to reality’, so to speak, is given by the
deductive system, more precisely, by the introduction rules. Now, since the meanings
no longer depend on the semantics, but have been given by syntax, it becomes clear
that valuation semantics for intuitionistic logic are nothing but mathematical represen-
tations of the formal system.
The origin of this idea is in [Gentzen(1935)], where the natural deduction system
NJ for intuitionistic logic is presented. There we ﬁnd the passage already mentioned in
section 4, according to which the introduction rules are ‘deﬁnitions’ of the respective
symbols [Gentzen(1935), p. 80]. From this perspective, the meaning of the connective
_, for example, is given by how we use it in inferences which are not concerned with
preservation of truth, but rather with preservation of availability of a (constructive)
proof. The introduction rules for disjunction say that having available a proof of A
(or a proof of B) is a sufﬁcient condition for having a proof of the disjunction A _ B.
Intuitionistically, a disjunction cannot be obtained otherwise.
We propose to expand the basic idea of inferential semantics to the paraconsistent
logics BLE and LETJ . On what regards BLE, the point is how we use the connectives
in inferences that preserve evidence. So, the meanings of the logical connectives is
also given by the inference rules, but now in a context where what is at stake is preser-
vation of evidence. The same idea applies to LETJ , that is able to deal simultaneously
with evidence and truth. In LETJ , classical logic holds for formulas marked with ◦.
Thus, we can say that for such formulas the meaning of the connectives is classical.11
10Since we are going to extend the idea of proof-theoretic semantics to paraconsistent logics that are not
concerned with ‘truth obtained by means of a proof’, but rather with ‘preservation of evidence’, we prefer
to use the more general expression ‘inferential semantics’.
11A more detailed analysis of the natural deduction rules of BLE and LETJ regarding preservation of
evidence and truth is given in [Carnielli and Rodrigues(2016c)].
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8 A calculus for factive and unfactive evidence
The logics BLE and LETJ deﬁne a notion of preservation of evidence in a precise
way. But the corresponding notion of evidence is not formal. Melvin Fitting has
provided in [Fitting(2016)] a formal alternative by means of the so-called justiﬁcation
logics. Fitting was able to show that BLE has both implicit and explicit evidence
interpretations in a strictly formal sense. It is convenient to recall that BLE is presented
through natural deduction rules, where the underlying idea is that rules should preserve
evidence for an assertion, rather than its truth. A sequent calculus for the equivalent
logic N4 can be found in [Kamide and Wansing(2012)].
The plan followed in [Fitting(2016)] has a close analogy with the case of intu-
itionistic propositional logic, which is known since the work of [Gödel(1933)] to
be embeddable into the modal logic S4. It was proved later (see [Artemov(2001)],
[Artemov(2008)] and [Artemov and Fitting(2015)]) that S4 in turn embeds into the
strong justiﬁcation logic LP ,12 and the latter embeds into arithmetic. The logic LP
provides a kind of calculus for certain justiﬁcation terms. These terms can be re-
garded as representatives of proofs, and instead of ⇤A we may write t : A, where t is
a justiﬁcation term. The plan is the following:
1. It is ﬁrst shown that BLE embeds into the modal logicKX4 explained below, a
logic of implicit uncertain evidence, in which⇤A can be interpreted as asserting
that there is evidence for A, where this evidence can be partial or uncertain, and
sometimes even incomplete and contradictory.
2. It is shown, furthermore, thatKX4 in its turn embeds into the justiﬁcation logic
JX4, whose terms express pieces of uncertain evidence and are closed under
certain operations that perform on such pieces of evidence.
The current axiomatization of the modal logic S4, inherited from Kurt Gödel,
builds on the idea that ⇤ has some intrinsic provability properties. The fact that in-
tuitionistic logic embeds into S4 justiﬁes the view that ‘intuitionistic truth’ can be
understood as a version of provability from the viewpoint of a classical mathemati-
cian.
Provability may be considered as ‘evidence of the strongest kind’. [Fitting(2016)]
points out that provability coincides with the notion of evidence represented implicitly
in S4, and explicitly in LP . Proofs can be seen as factive evidence, that is, evidence
that is ‘certain and never mistaken’. In contrast, the notion of evidence treated in BLE
and represented implicitly inKX4, and explicitly in JX4, is unfactive in the sense of
being disputable, retrievable or non-conclusive.13
12It should not be confused with the Logic of Paradox of Priest [Priest(1979)]
13We take the liberty to coin the term ‘unfactive’ due to its enlightening character.
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KX4 is a normal modal (strict) subsystem of S4 obtained by dropping, precisely,
the axiom of the factivity
⇤A! A
and adding a new axiom schema called C4 or X for weaker or erroneous evidence:
⇤⇤A! ⇤A.
Informally, this schema expresses that evidence for the existence of evidence for A is
sufﬁcient to count as evidence for A. The other schemas forKX4 are the usualK:
⇤(A! B)! (⇤A! ⇤B)
and 4:
⇤A! ⇤⇤A
plus modus ponens. Obviously, inKX4
⇤⇤A ⌘ ⇤A
holds, which amounts to saying that evidence for the existence of evidence for some
A is the same as evidence for A.
In this way,KX4 is an implicit logic of unfactive (or non-factive) evidence, in the
same way S4 is a logic of provability (the term implicit refers to the fact that evidence
is not explicitly shown, but just existential, as indicated by the modal operator ⇤).
As remarked in [Fitting(2016)],KX4 is complete with respect to frames meeting the
conditions of transitivity and denseness.
The notion of ‘implicit evidence againstA’ is also treated. Evidence is understood
as something positive. The idea behind the rule ¬^ I , presented in Deﬁnition 1, is the
following: if  is evidence that A is false,  constitutes evidence that A ^ B is false.
An example given by Fitting illustrates this rule:
We see that it is not raining, for instance, this is positive evidence that it
is false that it is raining, and hence we have positive evidence that it is not
both raining and cold. [Fitting(2016)]
This justiﬁes a version of implicit evidence for BLE.
One of the two main results of [Fitting(2016)] reads:
THEOREM 8. Theorem on Implicit Evidence for BLE:
A is a theorem of BLE iffAf is a theorem ofKX4, whereAf is an inductively deﬁned
translation from the language of BLE into the language of KX4 using ⇤ that reads
as ‘implicit evidence for A’.
Proof: see [Fitting(2016)].
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An explicit counterpart toKX4, called JX4, can be obtained (omitting technical
details) in such a way that JX4 serves as a justiﬁcation counterpart of KX4 and is
connected with it via a realization theorem, just as LP and S4 are connected in the
sense of [Fitting(2015)].
The justiﬁcation formulas of JX4 are built up from propositional letters using the
usual propositional connectives, certain justiﬁcation terms and additional justiﬁcation
formulas of the kind t : A, given by the following formation rule: if t is a justiﬁcation
term and A is a justiﬁcation formula, then t : A is a justiﬁcation formula. Then it
comes to the second main result of [Fitting(2016)]:
THEOREM 9. Explicit Evidence for BLE:
Af is a theorem ofKX4 if and only if some normal realization of Af is a theorem of
JX4.
Proof: see [Fitting(2016)].
The fact that the logic BLE embeds into the modal logicKX4 (via the Theorem on
Implicit Evidence for BLE) justiﬁes the view, in analogy with the intuitionistic case,
that derivability in BLE can be understood as (preservation of) unfactive evidence
from the viewpoint of a classical philosopher. The Theorem on Explicit Evidence for
BLE grants that such evidence is rigorous and can be treated in a formal calculus.
Several examples are given in [Fitting(2016)], while leaving as an open problem an
investigation of LETJ in terms of formalized implicit and explicit evidence.
9 An algebraic approach: Fidel structures for BLE
and LETJ
9.1 Nelson’s logic N4 and the basic logic of evidence BLE: differ-
ent views under equivalent formalisms
D. Nelson introduced in [Nelson(1949)] a constructible interpretation for the ﬁrst-
order number theory based on intuitionistic logic. Nelson’s aims was to overcome
what appears to be a non-constructive feature of the intuitionistic negation ¬. In Nel-
son’s logic N of 1949 some principles valid in the standard intuitionistic logic are
not valid – a remarkable example is the principle of non-contradiction ¬(A ^ ¬A) –
and some principles intuitionistically invalid are valid in N. In the ﬁrst-order system
N for number theory obtained from Nelson’s interpretation, the resulting negation
called strong negation (here denoted by −) satisﬁes all the properties of a De Morgan
negation as well as the following meta-property:
` −(A ^B) implies ` −A or ` −B.
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Indeed, from the constructive viewpoint, it seems plausible that supposing a formula
A ^B has been proved false, either a proof of the falsity of A or a proof of the falsity
of B should be available.
In 1959 Nelson introduced a system called S based on positive ﬁrst-order intuition-
istic logic (see [Nelson(1959)]) which turned out to be paraconsistent for secondary
reasons. Together with A. Almukdad, he later proposed, in 1984, a variant of S called
N− (see [Almukdad and Nelson(1984)]). This system became the standard presenta-
tion of Nelson’s paraconsistent logic. [Odintsov(2003)] rebaptizedN− as N4, proving
that it is sound and complete with respect to a class of algebras called N4-lattices, as
well as with respect to a variant of an algebraic-relational class of structures originally
introduced by M. Fidel in [Fidel(1977b)] for da Costa’s calculi Cn and afterwards for
Nelson’s logic N in [Fidel(1980)]. This kind of structures, called Fidel-structures or
F-structures in [Odintsov(2003)], will be adapted here (Section 9.3 below) to give a
semantical characterization for system LETJ . It is worth noting that [Odintsov(2004)]
also proposed an interesting semantics for N4 in terms of twist-structures, a general
semantical framework which was independently proposed by [Fidel(1977a)] and by
[Vakarelov(1977)].
As we have mentioned, the logic BLE is equivalent to N4. However, we must
emphasize that BLE has been found independently of N4, based on a completely dif-
ferent motivation – namely, a logic able to express the deductive behaviour of a notion
weaker than truth in order to provide an intuitive and clear interpretation for paracon-
sistency negation that does not depend on the simultaneous truth of a pair of contra-
dictory sentences. Of course, all the technical results valid for N4 are also valid for
BLE, but their intended meaning are rather divergent.
9.2 Fidel-structures semantics for N4/BLE
From the contemporary perspective, the relationship between logic and algebra
comes back to the ideas of A. Lindenbaum and A. Tarski of interpreting the for-
mulas of a given logic with the aid of algebras with operations associated to the
logical connectives. This approach was generalized by W. Blok and D. Pigozzi
in [Blok and Pigozzi(1989)], in order to encompass a wider range of logics. After-
wards, several generalizations of Blok and Pigozzi’s technique were proposed in the
literature (see, for instance, [Font and Jansana(2009)] and [Font(2016)]). However,
several logic systems lie outside the scope of the general methods of contemporary al-
gebraic logic. For instance, the logics of da Costa’s hierarchyCn are not algebraizable
by these methods, and the same holds for most of the LFIs studied in the literature
(see [Carnielli and Coniglio(2016)]).
In 1977, Manuel Fidel proved, for the ﬁrst time, the decidability of the calculi
Cn using an original algebraic-relational class of semantical structures called Cn-
structures [?, see]]ﬁdel.1977. This kind of structure was called Fidel-structures or
9.2 Fidel-structures semantics for N4/BLE 65
F-structures in [Odintsov(2003)] (see also [Odintsov(2008)]). Brieﬂy, a Cn-structure
is a triple hA, {Na}a2A, {N
(n)
a }a2Ai such that A is a Boolean algebra with domain
A and eachNa andN
(n)
a is a non-empty subset ofA. Intuitively, b 2 Na and c 2 N
(n)
a
means that b and c are possible values for the paraconsistent negation ¬a of a and for
the ‘well-behavior’ (or ‘consistency’) a◦ of a, respectively. Because of the previous
observations, the use of relations instead of functions for interpreting these two ‘non-
truth-functional’ connectives seems to be appropriate.
As observed in [Odintsov(2008)], the logic N4 lies in an intermediary stage with
regards to algebraizability: the usual equivalence
A$ B
def
= (A! B) ^ (B ! A)
does not deﬁne a logical congruence with respect to negation. That is, it is possible
that the negations of equivalent formulas are not equivalent. For instance, given a
propositional variable p, the formulas ¬(p ! p) and ¬(p ! (q ! p)) are not equiv-
alent in this logic, despite (p ! p) and (p ! (q ! p)) being both valid (and so
equivalent). However, it is possible to deﬁne a strong equivalence
A, B
def
= (A$ B) ^ (¬A$ ¬B)
which constitutes a logical congruence in N4. Because of this, the following weak
replacement property holds in N4 (and so in BLE):
PROPOSITION 10. [Odintsov(2008), Proposition 8.1.3] The logic N4 [BLE] satisﬁes
the following weak replacement rule:
if ` A, B then ` C[p/A]$ C[p/B]
for every formula C, where C[p/A] (resp., C[p/B]) denotes the formula obtained
from C by replacing the variable p by the formula A (by the formula B, resp.).
As proved in [Odintsov(2008), Section 8.4], there exists a class of algebraic struc-
tures called N4-lattices associated to the logic N4. The class of N4-lattices is a variety,
that is, it can be axiomatized by a set of equations. As Odintsov has shown, the logic
N4 (and so BLE) is algebraizable in the sense of [Blok and Pigozzi(1989)] by means of
the variety of N4-lattices. Despite this algebraic characterization, Odintsov obtained
another characterization of N4 in respect of F-structures, by generalizing the proposal
by M. Fidel in 1979 for the original Nelson’s system N (see [Fidel(1980)]).
All the results mentioned above, of course, hold also for BLE. However, differently
of N4/BLE, it is not clear whether or not the extension LETJ of BLE is algebraizable
by Blok and Pigozzi’s method. Indeed, it is possible to deﬁne, in a similar way to N4,
the following equivalence formula:
A⌦ B
def
= (A$ B) ^ (¬A$ ¬B) ^ (◦A$ ◦B).
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Clearly, it deﬁnes a logical congruence in LETJ , and so it induces a weak replacement
property for LETJ analogous to that for N4 stated in Proposition 10. It is an open
problem to determine if this congruence is trivial, namely, whether or not it is the
case that: if ` A ⌦ B holds in LETJ then A = B, for every formulas A and B.
More generally, it is a open problem to detemine if LETJ admits non-trivial logical
congruences. This question justiﬁes the present semantical approach to LETJ in terms
of Fidel-structures, which expands the ones deﬁned by Odintsov for the logic N4. The
details of the construction will be described in Section 9.3.
Let us recall that an implicative lattice is an algebra A = hA,^,_,!, 1i where
hA,^,_, 1i is a lattice with top element 1 such that there exists the supremum
W
{c 2
A : a ^ c  b} for every a, b 2 A. Here,  denotes the partial order associated
with the lattice, namely: a  b iff a = a ^ b iff b = a _ b; and
W
X denotes the
supremum of the set X ✓ A w.r.t. , whenever it exists. In addition, ! is a binary
operator (called implication) such that a ! b def=
W
{c 2 A : a ^ c  b} for every
a, b 2 A. It is well-known that, if an implicative lattice has a bottom element 0, then
it is a Heyting algebra.
DEFINITION 11. Fidel-structures for BLE (N4)
A Fidel-structure for BLE (or an F-structure for BLE) is a pair
E =
⌦
A, {Na}a2A
↵
such that A = hA,^,_,!, 1i is an implicative lattice and {Na}a2A is a family of
nonempty subsets of A where, for every a, b, c, d 2 A, the following holds:
(1) if c 2 Na, then a 2 Nc;
(2) if c 2 Na and d 2 Nb, then c ^ d 2 Na_b;
(3) if c 2 Na and d 2 Nb, then c _ d 2 Na^b;
(4) if d 2 Nb, then a ^ d 2 Na!b.
Intuitively, c 2 Na means that c is a ‘possible negation’ ¬a of a.
DEFINITION 12. A valuation over an F-structure E =
⌦
A, {Na}a2A
↵
for BLE is a
mapping v from the language L1 to A satisfying the following:
(1) v(¬p) 2 Nv(p), for every propositional letter p;
(2) v(A#B) = v(A)#v(B) for # 2 {^,_,!};
(3) v(¬(A ^B)) = v(¬A) _ v(¬B);
(4) v(¬(A _B)) = v(¬A) ^ v(¬B);
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(5) v(¬(A! B)) = v(A) ^ v(¬B);
(6) v(¬¬A) = v(A).
Let P be the set of propositional letters of L1. A valuation is completely determined
by its values over the set P [ {¬p : p 2 P}. It is immediate to prove the following:
PROPOSITION 13. Let v be a valuation over an F-structure E for BLE. Then v(¬A) 2
Nv(A) for every formula A.
The semantical consequence relation associated with F-structures is deﬁned in a
natural way:
DEFINITION 14. Let Γ [ {A} ✓ L1 and let E be a Fidel-structure for BLE. Then, A
follows from Γ in E , written as Γ |=E
F
A, if, for every valuation v over E , v(A) = 1
whenever v(B) = 1 for every B 2 Γ. We say that A is a semantical consequence
of Γ (w.r.t. Fidel-structures for BLE, denoted by Γ |=FBLE A, if Γ |=
E
F
A for every
F-structure E for BLE.
Then, the following holds (see [Odintsov(2008)]):
THEOREM 15. Adequacy of BLE (N4) w.r.t. Fidel-structures Let Γ [ {A} be a set of
formulas such that Γ is non-trivial in BLE. Then:
Γ `BLE A iff Γ |=FBLE A.
9.3 Fidel-structures semantics for LETJ
Recall that the logic LETJ is an extension of BLE in the language L2 obtained by
adding the rules PEM◦ and EXP ◦ to the latter (Deﬁnition 2). Given the adequacy
of BLE w.r.t. F-structures (Theorem 15), it is natural to consider extensions of these
F-structures, in order to capture semantically the logic LETJ .
DEFINITION 16. Fidel-structures for LETJ
A Fidel-structure for LETJ (or an F-structure for LETJ ) is a triple
E =
⌦
A, {Na}a2A, {Oa}a2A
↵
whereA = hA,^,_,!, 0, 1i is a Heyting algebra,
⌦
A, {Na}a2A
↵
is a Fidel-structure
for BLE (N4), and {Oa}a2A is a family of nonempty subsets of A such that, for every
a, b 2 A, the following holds:
(FJ) if b 2 Na then BDab \BCab 6= ;, where
BDab =
�
c 2 Oa : c! (a _ b) = 1
 
and
BCab =
�
c 2 Oa : a ^ b ^ c = 0
 
.
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REMARK 17. Let A be a Heyting algebra, and let ÷ be the intuitionistic negation in
A, which is deﬁned as ÷a = a ! 0 for every a 2 A. For each a 2 A let a# be
the set {b 2 A : b  a}. Observe that a ^ c = 0 if and only if c 2 (÷a)#, and
c! a = 1 iff c 2 a#, for every a, c 2 A. Then, condition (FJ) states that, if b 2 Na,
then Oa \ (a _ b)# \ (÷(a ^ b))# 6= ;. Equivalently, (FJ) requires that, if b 2 Na,
then Oa \ ((a _ b) ^ ÷(a ^ b))# 6= ;.
Intuitively, b 2 Na means that b is a ‘possible negation’ ¬a of a, while c 2 Oa
means that c is a ‘possible recovery value’ ◦a of a coherent with a given b 2 Na. This
is supported by the following deﬁnition:
DEFINITION 18. A valuation over an F-structure E =
⌦
A, {Na}a2A, {Oa}a2A
↵
for
LETJ is a map v from L2 to A satisfying the clauses (2)-(6) of Deﬁnition 12, plus the
following properties, for every formula A:
(1) v(¬A) 2 Nv(A);
(2) v(◦A) 2 BDv(A)v(¬A) \BCv(A)v(¬A).
REMARK 19. Given that B ^ ¬B ^ ◦B is a bottom (that is, trivializing) formula in
LETJ , for any formula B, then ÷A can be represented in LETJ by A ! (B ^ ¬B ^
◦B). Being so, v(÷A) = ÷v(A) for every valuation v over an F-structure E for
LETJ .
EXAMPLE 20. Let R be the set of real numbers endowed with the usual topology
generated by the open intervals of the form (a, b), (−1, a) and (a,+1). It is well-
known that the set of open subsets of R constitutes a Heyting algebra ⌦(R) where
1 = R, 0 = ; and, for every X,Y 2 ⌦(R): X _ Y = X [ Y ; X ^ Y = X \ Y ;
and X ! Y = Int((R \X) [ Y ), where Int(Z) denotes the interior of a subset Z
of R (that is, the greatest open contained in Z). Hence ÷X = Int(R \X). Consider
an F-structure E over ⌦(R) such that (1, 3) 2 N(0,2). Let A,B two formulas and
let v be a valuation v over E such that v(A) = (0, 2) and v(B) = (1, 3). Then
v(A _ B) = v(A) [ v(B) = (0, 3); v(A ^ B) = v(A) \ v(B) = (1, 2); and
v(÷(A^B)) = ÷v(A^B) = (−1, 1)[ (2,+1). Thus, by Remark 17, the element
v(◦A) of O(0,2) must be an open subset of v(A_B)\ v(÷(A^B)) = (0, 1)[ (2, 3).
The next step is to prove that the proposed semantics for LETJ is adequate, that is,
the logic LETJ is sound and complete w.r.t. Fidel-structures. The proof will be similar
to the one obtained by Odintsov for N4 (see [Odintsov(2008)]) and the adaptation to
mbC given in [Carnielli and Coniglio(2016), ch. 6].
Let Γ be a non-trivial theory in LETJ , that is, a set of formulas such that Γ 0LETJ
A for some formula A. Deﬁne the following relation ⌘Γ between the formulas of L2:
A ⌘Γ B iff Γ `LETJ A! B and Γ `LETJ B ! A.
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It is immediate to prove that ⌘Γ is an equivalence relation. Moreover, ⌘Γ is a
congruence w.r.t. the connectives in the language of positive intuitionistic logic (PIL).
Denote by [A]Γ the equivalence class of each formula A and let
AΓ
def
= L2/⌘Γ = {[A]Γ : A 2 L2}
be the set of all the equivalence classes. From the observation above, it is possible to
deﬁne the following operations:
[A]Γ# [B]Γ
def
= [A#B]Γ for # 2 {^,_,!}.
All these operations are well-deﬁned, that is, they do not depend upon the repre-
sentative chosen for each equivalence class. This means that
AΓ
def
=
⌦
AΓ,^,_,!, 0Γ, 1Γ
↵
(where 0Γ
def
= [p1 ^ ¬p1 ^ ◦p1]Γ and 1Γ
def
= [p1 ! p1]Γ) is a Heyting algebra, given
that 0Γ is a bottom element of the underlying implicative lattice. It is now possible to
deﬁne from here an F-structure for LETJ by considering
N[A]Γ
def
=
�
[¬B]Γ : B 2 [A]Γ
 
and
O[A]Γ
def
=
�
[◦B]Γ : B 2 [A]Γ
 
for every [A]Γ 2 AΓ. This structure will be called the Lindenbaum F-structure for
LETJ over Γ. Observe that this is coherent with the intuitive reading for the sets Na
and Oa given above.
PROPOSITION 21. Let Γ be a non-trivial theory in LETJ , and let AΓ and AΓ as
above. Then, the triple
EΓ =
⌦
AΓ, {Na}a2AΓ , {Oa}a2AΓ
↵
is an F-structure for LETJ .
Proof. The pair EΓ =
⌦
AΓ, {Na}a2AΓ
↵
is an F-structure for BLE(N4)
(see [Odintsov(2008)]). It remains to prove that the family {Oa}a2AΓ satisﬁes the
requirement (FJ) of Deﬁnition 16. Thus, let [¬B]Γ 2 Na (for a given a 2 AΓ). Then,
B 2 a and so a = [B]Γ. From this, [◦B]Γ 2 Oa satisﬁes:
[◦B]Γ !
�
a _ [¬B]Γ
�
= [◦B]Γ !
�
[B]Γ _ [¬B]Γ
�
= [◦B ! (B _ ¬B)]Γ = 1Γ
since ◦B ! (B _ ¬B) ⌘Γ p1 ! p1. In an analogous way it is proved that
a ^ [¬B]Γ ^ [◦B]Γ = [B]Γ ^ [¬B]Γ ^ [◦B]Γ = [B ^ ¬B ^ ◦B]Γ = 0Γ
sinceB^¬B^◦B ⌘Γ p1^¬p1^◦p1. This means that condition (FJ) is satisﬁed.
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We thus arrive at the desired result:
THEOREM 22 (Adequacy of LETJ w.r.t. Fidel-structures). Let Γ [ {A} be a set of
formulas such that Γ is non-trivial in LETJ . The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) Γ `LETJ A;
(2) Γ |=F A;
(3) Γ |=EΓ
F
A.
Proof. (1)) (2): This is the Soundness theorem, which can be proved in a straight-
forward way as usual. Indeed, it is enough to prove that all the rules of LETJ are valid
w.r.t. F-structures.
(2)) (3): It is an immediate consequence of Deﬁnition 14.
(3) ) (1): Let v : L2 ! L2/⌘Γ be the canonical mapping given by v(B) = [B]Γ.
By the very deﬁnition of AΓ, it follows that v is a valuation over EΓ satisfying the
following: v(B) = 1Γ iff Γ `LETJ B, for every formula B. Hence, v(B) = 1Γ for
every B 2 Γ, which, by hypothesis, implies that v(A) = 1Γ. That is, Γ `LETJ A.
10 Final remarks
This paper reviewed the main points of the approach to paraconsistent with reference
to preservation of evidence. The ideas presented also suggests a promising approach
to the issue of logical pluralism. The difference between classical, intuitionistic and
paraconsistent logics, the last two understood from the epistemic point of view, is
what is being preserved – respectively, truth, availability of a constructive proof and
availability of evidence. Notice that there is a kind of informal duality in this reading
of these three logics, since proof is a notion stronger (and evidence weaker) than truth.
This helps to understand that the pluralist perspective is perfectly coherent, and in
principle nothing prevents these three logics to be combined in some kind of ‘general
approach to rationality’.
It is also worth noting that the formalization of the notion of evidence provided
by M. Fitting, as surveyed in Section 8, is yet another indication that we have taken
the correct path basing the epistemic approach on the (formal and informal) duality
between paraconsistency and paracompleteness. Actually, there are several ‘conver-
gences’ in our approach. As it has been mentioned, the logic BLE has been conceived
independently of Nelson’s N4, although they are equivalent. The ‘evidence interpre-
tation’ of BLE is endorsed by the fact that BLE is related to justiﬁcation logics, as
Fitting has shown. The paper also proves in Section 9 that both BLE and LETJ are
semantically characterized through F-structures, a kind of algebraic-relational seman-
tic structures. There are, however, several points yet to be developed and investigated.
The ﬁrst is to check how much F-structures can help to solve the algebraizability prob-
lem for LETJ , an open problem by now (BLE, being equivalent to N4, is algebraizable
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in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi). The second problem was raised by Fitting: how to
formalize the notions of implicit and explicit evidence for LETJ (as it was done for
BLE in [Fitting(2016)]). The third, philosophically more ambitious, is how to frame
the classical, intuitionistic and paraconsistent paradigms in terms of preservation of
levels of evidence. This would be a leap towards a better understanding of logical
pluralism.
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